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Abstract
Scholars of international communication recognize that strategic narratives are important for policymaking (Miskimmon,
O’Loughlin, & Roselle, 2013) and scholars studying alliances suggest that communication is central to the formation and
maintenance of alliances (Weitsman, 2010). This essay addresses how strategic narratives affect US alliance behavior—
and hence international order—in two specific ways. First, alliance behavior can be affected by other allies’ narratives as
demonstrated in the case of military intervention in Libya in 2011. Here the evidence suggests that the UK and France
were able to use strategic narratives to influence the decision of the US to agree to military intervention in Libya by using
narratives that could evoke a fear of abandonment. Second, alliance cohesion can be affected by narrative contestation
by non-allies as demonstrated in the case of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014. Russia has used strategic narratives in a new
media environment in an attempt to elicit a fear of entrapment to counter the US attempts to coordinate alliance sup-
port for economic sanctions. In both cases, distinguishing between system, identity, and policy narratives give us a deeper
understanding of narrative contestation today. This analysis adds to our understanding of the factors that affect alliances
set within a new media environment characterized by a proliferation of sources and outlets and thus a more horizontal
structure of information exchange.
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1. Introduction
The study of alliances is central to international order as
alliances speak to the ability of states to cooperate, par-
ticularly during conflict (Snyder, 1997; Weitsman, 2004,
2010).Much of the literature on alliances in international
relations concentrates on alliance formation and utilizes
a realist lens that emphasizes the distribution of power
within the system and resulting behavior such as balance,
tethering, and bandwagoning (Walt, 2011). Research has
also been done on variability in the reliability of alliance
agreements (Kegley & Raymond, 1990). The literature
does suggest that communication is central to the forma-
tion and maintenance of alliances, and this essay seeks
to address how strategic narratives function in alliance
relationships today. This analysis, then, focuses on the
(re)construction of alliances, and speaks to Weitsman’s
point that in regard to research on alliances “construc-
tivist and identity-based arguments are becoming more
prevalent and will likely continue to be an important re-
search focus in the coming years” (Weitsman, 2010).
This paper uses two case studies to illustrate the im-
portance of different types of strategic narratives and
their projection via the media in shaping alliance behav-
ior and international order. Specifically, a strategic nar-
rative analysis that distinguishes international system,
identity, and policy narratives is used to assess whether
and how these types of narratives accord with fears of
abandonment and entrapment within the alliance itself
(Snyder, 1997). The first case is the March 2011 US de-
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cision to support the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973 that established a no-fly zone in Libya.
In this case France and the UK were successful in pro-
jecting a strategic narrative that suggested that the US
would be isolated, if not abandoned, if theObama admin-
istration opposed the resolution. The second case consid-
ers Russian attempts to challenge European support for
economic sanctions against Russia in light of events in
Ukraine in 2014. This case highlights how Russia’s strate-
gic narrative sought to foster a fear of entrapment by
Western allies, especially among specific countries, pri-
marily in Eastern Europe.
2. Alliances and Communication
Alliances during conflict by definition are relationships
that facilitate coordinated efforts to respond, so per-
haps most important to the alliance relationship during
conflict is alliance cohesion. Alliances and/or coalitions
complicate crisis policymaking because “there must be
interoperability—in terms of language, communications,
doctrine, and the exchange of information” (Weitsman,
2010). Snyder (1997, p. 180) discusses the management
of alliances at length in his seminal work and elaborates
on the alliance security dilemma. Arguing that over the
longer term alliance partners’ “attention centers less on
particular interests and conflicts with an adversary and
more on the manipulation of apparent commitment to
the alliance to offset shifts in dependence relationships
between the allies themselves” (Snyder, 1997, p. 180),
Snyder (1997, pp. 180–181) highlights the importance
of understanding what he calls the security–autonomy
trade-off and the tension between the fear of abandon-
ment and the fear of entrapment. Especially over the
long-term, so certainly in prolonged or protracted con-
flict situations, Snyder claims that on the one hand states
may fear that their allies will abandon the alliance for
any number of reasons. On the other hand, as time goes
on, states may fear that they are becoming entrapped by
the alliance itself. Domestic political considerations may
change in states and/or external events may shift condi-
tions related to the conflict and contribute to changes in
the dynamics of alliance relationships over time.
Snyder (1997, p. 181) suggests that fear of aban-
donment can be addressed by increasing one’s commit-
ment to the partner, but this may also increase the pos-
sibility of entrapment—hence the dilemma. The litera-
ture on fears of entrapment and abandonment suggest
that states react in patterned ways to alleviate these
fears. Snyder (1997, p. 313), for example, asserts that
fear of abandonment leads to “movement toward the
ally”. Specifically, this includes making or reiterating ex-
plicit alliance pledges, alliance revisions, and appeasing
or moving closer to an ally’s position. States that fear en-
trapment1 “will either loosen their general alliance com-
mitment or withhold support from their allies” (Snyder,
1997, p. 315). Snyder does make the caveat that states
that fear entrapment will give firm commitments when
the ally is unrestrainable. The case studies presented be-
low test these assumptions in regard to leadership strate-
gic narratives.
The severity of the alliance security dilemma is deter-
mined by three factors, according to Snyder—interests,
dependence, and commitment. Kegley and Raymond
(1990, p. 254), for their part, also focus on interests, ar-
guing that changes in alliances are related directly to
changes in conditions related to interest diversion and
that “uncertainty will increase the longer the alliance re-
mains in force” (Kegley & Raymond, 1990, p. 61). The fo-
cus on bargaining and interests sidesteps the important
question of how interests (and dependence and commit-
ment) are understood and this squarely highlights the
importance of the (re)construction of alliance relation-
ships and the importance of communication. Construc-
tivists would point out that if interests are constructed,
then interest diversion is constructed as well, for exam-
ple. In other words similar changes in conditions may or
may not lead to the identification of interest diversion.
Likewise, Snyder (1997, p. 182) suggests that risk of en-
trapment, for example, is “sensitive to the degree of com-
monality or disjunction between allies’ interests”, and so
fears of entrapment and abandonment are constructed
as well. In other words, the same situation or event will
not necessarily lead to fears of entrapment or abandon-
ment. It is important to understand how these fears are
constructed and this essay seeks to address this gap in
the literature.
That said, while not explaining fully how interests are
constructed, Snyder and others who study alliance re-
lationships certainly recognize the importance of com-
munication to alliance maintenance. So even within his
conceptual framework focusing on bargaining he sug-
gests that:
Between allies, bargaining power will turn on per-
ceptions of their comparative dependence, commit-
ments, and intensity of interests in whatever they
are bargaining about….The principal function of actual
bargaining communications is to modify others’ per-
ceptions of these relationships and of one’s own be-
havior, so as to enhance one’s own bargaining power.
(Snyder, 1997, p. 37)
Snyder is not alone. Other international relations schol-
ars note the importance of communication to alliance
relationships:
“Bargaining power accrues not necessarily to the
party possessing superior resources generally, but the
party which possesses issue-specific resources, is able
to communicate its resolve clearly and convincingly,
and is able to exploit asymmetries in its relation. (Jon-
sson, 1981, as cited in Kegley & Raymond, 1990, p. 55)
1 Fear of entrapment and abandonment can exist simultaneously. Snyder’s (1997) discussion pertains to the relative strength of each.
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Kegley and Raymond (1990, p. 56) suggest that the most
common technique tomaintain coalition solidarity is per-
suasion. Thus, without understanding communication
processes we cannot understand alliance management
and policymaking. The literature on strategic narratives
focuses squarely on the communication processes of for-
eign policy behavior.
3. Narratives and International Relations
The narrative turn in international relations and foreign
policy is marked by a range of different approaches to
understanding how narratives or stories affect interna-
tional relations. Similar ideas have been studied across
the IR and Foreign Policy Analysis that show a need for
increased cross-fertilization across sub-fields. For exam-
ple, some of Subotić’s (2016) ideas about the manip-
ulation of narratives for political purposes are similar
to the ideas of Miskimmon et al. (2013) on strategic
narratives. Analyses of “autobiographical identity narra-
tives” found in Innes and Steele (2013) and Berenskoet-
ter (2012) address issues of identity and ontological se-
curity. Much of the foreign policy literature in this area
has focused on narratives about particular policies ormil-
itary actions, as one might expect. This includes work
on military operations and strategic communication, in-
cluding in Afghanistan (Betz, 2011; De Graaf, Dimitriu, &
Ringsmose, 2015; Jakobsen, 2017; Ringsmose & Børge-
sen, 2011). For an important critique of strategic commu-
nication literature see Holmqvist (2013).
This essay uses the strategic narrative framework set
out by Miskimmon et al. (2013), Miskimmon, O’Loughlin
and Roselle (2017), and Roselle, O’Loughlin and Miskim-
mon (2014) which links international relations questions
related to international order for example, with foreign
policy analyses that focus on specific policy decisions. De-
cisions taken within an alliance fall squarely at the nexus
of IR and Foreign Policy Analysis and the strategic narra-
tive analysis introduced by Miskimmon et al. (2013) gets
at exactly this. Strategic narratives are here defined as
narratives “forged by a state with the express purpose
of influencing the foreign policy behavior of other ac-
tors” (Miskimmon et al., 2013) and are frameworks con-
structed to allow people to make sense of the world,
policies, events, and interactions (Antoniades, Miskim-
mon, & O’Loughlin, 2010; Freedman, 2006; Kaldor, Mar-
tin, & Selchow, 2007). Miskimmon et al. (2013) set out
three types of narratives: International System Narra-
tives, National Narratives, and Issue (or Policy) Narratives.
This work builds on Bially Mattern’s (2005, p. 5) obser-
vation that, “neither power politics nor common inter-
ests can create stable, shared expectations and behav-
iors among states”. Wemust understand narratives to un-
derstand international order because these help shape
perceptions of power and interests. In terms of alliances,
Kegley and Raymond (1990) suggest that the most com-
mon technique to maintain coalition solidarity is persua-
sion. Thus, without understanding communication pro-
cesses we cannot understand alliance maintenance and
(re)construction. Two significant areas are important to
understand. First, how do those inside of an alliance at-
tempt to shape an alliance’s preferred policies? Second,
how do those outside of the alliance attempt to disrupt
alliance narratives and undermine the alliance itself? The
strategic narrative analysis here asserts that this goeswell
beyond rallying support or undermining a specific pol-
icy to include how narratives about identity and interna-
tional order scaffold thesemore specific policy narratives.
4. A Strategic Narrative Analysis
Specifically, the analysis undertaken here is a strategic
narrative analysis designed to assess to what degree and
how political actors attempt to use narratives to raise
fears of abandonment and fears of entrapment designed
to change the behavior of other actors. Strategic nar-
ratives fall into three categories. International System
Narratives describe how the world is structured, who
the players are, and how it works. Examples would in-
clude narratives such as the Cold War, the War on Terror,
and the Liberal International Order. Especially in a post-
bipolar international system, International System Nar-
ratives are contested. International System Narratives in-
clude narratives about alliances, which structure interna-
tional cooperation. Identity Narratives set out the story
of a political actor, what values it has, and what goals
it has. Examples of identity narratives include the US as
peace-loving and committed to freedom and democracy
(in the US), and the US as world bully (in other parts of
the world) (Berenskoetter, 2012).2 Alliances are made
coherent and/or cohesive, in part by narratives about
alliance values that fit with individual member states’
identity narratives (Flockhart, 2012). Issue Narratives set
out why a policy is needed and (normatively) desirable,
and how it will be successfully implemented or accom-
plished. Issue Narratives set policies or actions in a con-
text, with an explanation of who the important actors
are, what the conflict or issue is, and how a particular
course of actionwill resolve the underlying issue.3 Strate-
gic narratives at one level will be strengthened by reso-
nance with narratives at other levels. Importantly, Flock-
hart (2012, pp. 83–84) argues that identity construction
and narrative construction can reinforce or undermine
alliances through rhetorical and functional action. That
is, both rhetorical action (what political actors say) and
functional action (what political actors do) contribute to,
or undermine, alliance narratives. Policy choices are an
example of an action that can bolster or undermine al-
2 Berenskoetter (2012) identifies a biographical narrative of the state that delineates “an experience space (giving meaning to the past) intertwined with
an envisioned space (giving meaning to the future) and delineated through horizons of experience and of possibility, respectively”.
3 This is related to Alexander George’s (1989) work on policy legitimacy in which he argues that policies must be explained to political elites and the
public, at home and abroad, and that this explanation should communicate that the policy is right or good, and can be achieved.
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liance cohesion, but these are also embedded in broader
strategic narratives.
Snyder’s (1997) observation about the security
dilemma in alliances raises important theoretical ques-
tions about how strategic narratives might be employed
to affect state behavior within an alliance. One might ex-
pect, for example, that within alliances, if one or more
states want to gain the support of another for a pol-
icy decision, a strategic narrative that raises a fear of
abandonment—or being left behind—may be effective.
The implication is that if an ally does not go along with
a desired policy, that ally will be left out, if not aban-
doned. Theoretically, a system narrative that emphasizes
the need to bolster international order and an identity
narrative that claims that central common values are on
the line would be expected in this case. On the other
hand, if an outside state wants to disrupt an alliance, one
strategy would be to use narratives that suggest a fear of
entrapment, highlighting the “interests” that may be ig-
nored or restrained within the alliance. In this case one
would expect a system narrative that suggests how the
alliance is outdated or insufficient for the current inter-
national system. See Figure 1 below.
The case studies below assess whether and how this
process works, and how specific types of strategic narra-
tives bolster overarching fear narratives.
5. Methodology—Cases and Texts
The two cases presented here—UN Resolution 1973
(Libya) in March 2011 and the crisis in Ukraine 2014—
were chosen for a number of reasons. First, in both
cases alliance cohesion is threatened. In the case of UN-
SCR1973, alliancemembers in Europe and the US did not
agree on how to handle the situation in Libya. In the case
of Ukraine, the allies do not agree on the specifics of eco-
nomic sanctions. Second, in both cases US behavior is
constrained and theUS is not able to get its preferred pol-
icy implemented. In the case of Libya, the US is reluctant
to intervene but agrees to do so. In the case of Ukraine,
the US preferredmore stringent economic sanctions and
a united European counter to Russian actions in Ukraine.
The cases were also chosen because Snyder’s (1997) the-
ory about the alliance security dilemma suggests that in
the case of Libya, onewould expect to findUK and French
strategic narratives that foster a fear of abandonment
among US policymakers, and that in the case of Ukraine,
one would expect Russian strategic narratives that sup-
port a fear of entrapment among EU member states.
These cases were chosen as heuristic cases to high-
light how strategic narratives affect alliance behavior
(George & Bennett, 2005, p. 75).4 Each case is used to
explore important conceptual issues associated with the
role of strategic narratives in alliance maintenance, and
specifically to understand more about the use of system
and identity narratives in attempts to affect policy behav-
ior. In the case of UNSCR1973, the focus is on how France
and the UK used strategic narratives to secure US sup-
port for the resolution. The time period is relatively short
here, and while media does play a role, the focus is on
elite diplomatic strategic narratives. The Ukrainian case
examines whether and how adversaries, in this case Rus-
 
Within Alliance 
UK/France Desired 
Outcome:
* Draw alliance closer
*Achieve agreement 
on intervenon in 
Libya
Use Strategic 
Narraves which 
support a fear of 
abandonment by 
emphasizing the 
liberal internaonal 
order and common  
values and UK/French 
willingness to conduct 
policy without the U.S.
Outside of Alliance 
Russia Desired 
Outcome:
* Pull alliance apart
* No agreement on 
economic sancons 
Use Strategic 
Narraves which 
support a fear of 
entrapment by 
emphasizing a new 
world order and 
depicng the alliance 
as serving only the 
powerful 
Figure 1. Alliances, the security dilemma, and strategic narratives.
4 George and Bennett (2005, p. 75) say that heuristic cases “identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths”.
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sia, use strategic narratives in an attempt to undermine
the Western alliance.
To understand strategic narratives, they must be
traced. This involves identifying and analyzing the for-
mation, projection, and reception of strategic narra-
tives, “guarding against viewing this as a linear process”
(Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 184.) The case studies on
Libya and Ukraine focus on identifying strategic narra-
tives (in particular system and identity narratives) and
understanding how their content affects support for par-
ticular policies. In the Libya case, careful analysis of the
content and timing of French and British strategic narra-
tives in leadership statements is undertaken. All French
and UK leadership statements found on their respective
foreign ministry website were included in the analysis.
In addition, details associated with the dissemination of
French and British strategic narratives are found in mem-
oirs (including those of Clinton and Gates, for example)
and media interviews, which also suggest how US lead-
ers understood the narratives and how they affected US
policy behavior on Libya. This is a particularly interesting
case because there is significant detail about President
Obama’s decision-making process on this issue because
of Vanity Fair journalist Michael Lewis’s access to the
White House during this period. In the Ukraine case, the
focus is on how Russian strategic narratives found in the
speeches of President Putin and other Russian leaders.
These were found by searching the Russian government
website and through a Google news search looking for
full text documents. In addition, media coverage of Euro-
pean states’ reactions to proposed sanctions was gath-
ered (via Google news archive searches) to determine
whether specific political actors responded to these Rus-
sian narratives.
The speeches and interviews were analyzed to iden-
tify international system, identity, and policy strate-
gic narratives as detailed above by looking for narra-
tives about the structure and functioning of the interna-
tional system, narratives that speak to why and how al-
liances and states should react based on perceived val-
ues, and narratives that focus more directly on the spe-
cific policies. Then, these narrativeswere assessed to see
whether or not they supported a fear of abandonment or
entrapment.
6. Libya: UNSCR1973, March 20115
The debate over United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tion 1973 in March 2011 was a challenge for the US. The
Obama administrationwas not eager to commit forces in
Iraq as it was focused on ending US intervention in Iraq
and Afghanistan. In fact, many, if not most, of President
Obama’s advisors opposed involvement in Libya (Clinton,
2014, p. 370; Gates, 2014, pp. 517–522; Lewis, 2012).
France and theUKwere successful in their efforts to have
UNSCR1973 accepted, despite publically stated reserva-
tions of President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton.
In fact, France and the UK coordinated early on in the cri-
sis and thus the timing and content of their narratives
were broadly similar. The UK and French strategic nar-
ratives underscored a broader narrative of a liberal or-
der in which states have responsibilities to individuals
faced with authoritarian machinations. The implication
here was that if the US did not go along, it would be
outside of the liberal order. The brief case study below
was developed by analyzing diplomatic activity and ma-
jor speeches by French, British, and US leaders on the
situation in Libya in March 2011. It begins with consider-
ation of the French and British use of strategic narratives
and concludes with an assessment of the US response.
French and British strategic narratives pushed the US to
approve of the no fly zone and there is evidence that this
tipped the balance for President Obama on a decision
that was “one of those 51–49 decisions” (Lewis, 2012).
UNSCR1973 was adopted on 17March 2011. France, the
UK and the US voted in the affirmative, while Russia,
China, and Germany abstained.
France was a co-sponsor of UNSCR1973 and took
the initiative in diplomacy around its passage (The
Economist, 2011). France did attempt to use its presi-
dency of the G8 to mobilize support within the UN, but
was not able to get support for a no fly zone at the G8
meeting in Paris on 13–14 March 2011. As Minister of
Foreign and European Affairs Alain Juppé noted on 15
March 2011, “some of our partners, chief among them
my German counterpart, opposed any use of force. As
for Russia, she was hardly enthusiastic, and the US took
a long time to define her position” (Embassy of France in
Washington, 2011b).
French efforts continued through the effort of Presi-
dent Sarkozy and French philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy
in calling for action as Gaddafi’s forces threatened to at-
tack Benghazi (Clinton, 2014, p. 368; Lévy, 2011). Sarkozy
had spoken forcefully about Libya in February, saying
“the continuing brutal and bloody repression against the
Libyan civilian population is revolting”, and “the interna-
tional community cannot remain a spectator to these
massive violations of human rights” (Watt, 2011). The
French narrative stressed the violations of human rights
and the suffering of the Libyan people, the lack of le-
gitimacy of Gaddafi as leader, and the responsibility of
the international community to respond. This is also set
within the broader context of the Middle East “Arab
Spring”. Sarkozy met with US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton and pushed his case on 14 March 2011. Clinton
also met with rebel leader Mahmoud Jibril, who was ac-
companied by Levy (Clinton, 2012, p. 369).
When Alain Juppé, Ministre d’Etat, Minister of For-
eign and European Affairs spoke to UNSCR1973, he set
out the French narrative:
The world is experiencing one of the great revolu-
tions that change the course of history. From North
Africa to the Persian Gulf, the Arab people clamor to
5 This section is adapted in part from Miskimmon et al. (2013).
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breather the air of liberty and democracy. From the
Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia and the events of 25 Jan-
uary in Egypt, great hope arose and democratic transi-
tion was launched in a spirit of maturity and responsi-
bility….The newArab spring is good news, I am certain,
for all of us. Our duty and interest require us to sup-
port these developments with confidence and avail-
ability. Wemust not give free rein to warmongers; we
must not abandon civilian populations, the victims of
brutal repression, to their fate; wemust not allow the
rule of law and international morality to be trampled
underfoot. (UN Security Council Resolution 1973)
This sets out an International System Narrative that
stresses significant changes in the systemas authoritarian
rulers are overthrown. It also directly addresses France’s
own revolutionary Identity Narrative and calls for sup-
port for those fighting their own revolutions in 2011.
France’s narrative, defining a perception of order that ap-
proximates liberal interventionism, is clearly outlined in
Sarkozy’s speech on 19March after UNSCR1973 has been
adopted (Embassy of France in Washington, 2011a). As
military force is used, Sarkozy says: “Today, we are inter-
vening in Libya, under a mandate of the United Nations
Security Council, with our partners and in particular our
Arab partners. We are doing so to protect civilians from
the murderous madness of a regime which, in killing its
own people, has lost all legitimacy” (Embassy of France
in Washington, 2011a). As Engelbrekt (2014) notes, this
ties into R2P, the Responsibility to Protect which calls for
the international community “to prevent and halt mass
atrocity crimes perpetrated against civilians”.
The context for the UK narrative about Libya included
public skepticism towards military intervention after the
protracted military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
the UK commitment to working closely with the French
since the British–French agreement of November 2010.
When the French called for a no fly zone, the UK was first
cautious. Some reports speculated that this was due to
the fact that there were efforts underway to repatriate
UK citizens (Watt, 2011). Soon, however, Prime Minister
Cameron and the UK government would stand with the
French in supporting a no fly zone in Libya. After an EU
emergency summit on 11 March, where German opposi-
tion forestalled a united call for a no fly zone, Prime Min-
ister Cameron said:
The truth is this: Gaddafi is still on the rampage, wag-
ing war on his own people, hundreds of thousands
of people have been displaced and right now there is
no sign of this ending. Round the region people con-
tinue to campaign for change and their aspirations
have not yet been met. Britain should be a relentless
advocate for greater political openness, support for
human rights and non-violence. (Watt, 2011)
Cameron’s International System narrative focused on
change in the region and the UK’s responsibility to sup-
port this changes with fit with an Identity Narrative that
stressed UK support for human rights. Gaddafi was de-
picted as an illegitimate leader.
The UK’s Permanent Representative to the UN Mark
Lyall Grant outlined the UK’s rationale for supporting UN-
SCR1973, reaffirming the UK narrative (Grant, 2011). Af-
ter the vote, he said:
The situation in Libya is clear. A violent, discredited
regime which has lost all legitimacy is using weapons
of war against civilians….The international community
has come together in deploring the actions of theQad-
hafi regime and demanding that the regime end this
violence against the Libyan people. International opin-
ion has looked to the Security Council to act. The Arab
League has been particularly clear in its demands, in-
cluding for the imposition of a No-Fly Zone. That is
why the UK, in close cooperation with Lebanon and
France has pressed for the early adoption of this res-
olution. My government welcomes the fact that the
Council has acted swiftly and comprehensively in re-
sponse to the appalling situation in Libya and to the
appeal of the Arab League. (Smith, 2011)
The UK narrative, like the French, emphasized the re-
sponsibility of the international community to stand firm
against tyrants, especially when countries within the re-
gion (The Arab League) support the actions. It suggested
that the world was calling for action.
Turning to the US, the Libya crisis presented the
Obamaadministrationwith a number of challenges. Pres-
ident Obama’s foreign policy narrative stressed the end
of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the need for the
US to avoid unilateral actions, bolstering instead partner-
ships in the world. Obama’s strategic narrative empha-
sized a more “respectful” US state seeking to work with
others in the international system. Throughout his pres-
idency Obama “demonstrated a foreign policy position
caught between a narrative of American military with-
drawal and a narrative of American leadership and re-
sponsibility that reflected US great power identity. Pres-
sure to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan clashed with
the potential implications of involvement in Libya, with
no clear sense of the scope of themilitary operation. The
scaling back of US military operations coupled with the
desire to have other states share in maintaining interna-
tional order soon became the key pillars of Obama’s for-
eign policy doctrine” (Miskimmon et al., 2013, p. 79).
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with President
Sarkozy on 14 March 2011 and her memoir argues that
the President and Bernard-Henri Levy were “genuinely
moved by the plight of the Libyan people suffering at
the hands of a brutal dictator, and they made a persua-
sive case that something had to be done” (Clinton, 2014,
p. 368). Clinton also met with British Foreign Secretary
William Hague, who agreed with Sarkozy that action was
necessary, and she noted that “that counted for a lot”
(Clinton, 2014, p. 368). Finally, she met with Mahmoud
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Jibril, a Libyan political scientist representing the rebels,
who was accompanied by Levy (Clinton, 2014, p. 369).
All made the same argument—that there was a responsi-
bility to defend the people of Libya against the violence
of Qaddafi.
On 15 March 2011, Obama and advisors in Washing-
ton, DCdiscussed the issue of a no fly zone in Libya (Lewis,
2012). First it was established that a no fly zone alone
would not stop Qaddafi. Military intervention of some
sort would be needed. According to Lewis’s (2012) ac-
count of the meeting, most advisors opposed any inter-
vention in Libya, and Obama characterized this position
as follows:
We were engaged in Afghanistan. We still had equity
in Iraq. Our assets are strained. The participants are
asking a question: Is there a core national-security is-
sue at stake? As opposed to calibrating our national-
security interests in some new way.
Specifically, Secretary of Defense Gates, Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Vice President Biden, and
White House chief of staff William Daley were opposed
to action. “‘How are we going to explain to the Ameri-
can people why we’re in Libya’, asked William Daley, ac-
cording to one of those present. ‘And Daley had a point:
who gives a shit about Libya?’” (Lewis, 2012). However,
UN ambassador Susan Rice and Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton along with a few others among the junior staff
supported US intervention. They made the case that the
US should take responsibility. Lewis (2012) says that Ben
“Rhodes [who] would have to write the speech explain-
ing the decision…said in the meeting that he preferred
to explain why the US had prevented a massacre over
why it hadn’t”. For those who supported intervention,
the French and British narrative was resonant.
The argument for support for intervention went be-
yond a call to US values and the liberal international or-
der. Clinton also suggested that for US allies vital inter-
ests were at stake:
You know, we asked our allies, our NATO allies, to
go into Afghanistan with us 10 years ago. They have
been there, and a lot of them have been there despite
the fact they were not attacked. The attack came on
us, as we all tragically remember. They stuck with us.
When it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the
UK, France, Italy, other of our NATO allies. This was in
their vital national interest. (Clinton, as cited in Sale-
tan, 2011)
Dennis Ross, then Middle East expert at the National Se-
curity Council, said that Clinton also argued in “a fairly
clever way” (Becker & Shane, 2016). As quoted by Becker
and Shane, Ross recalls Clinton saying: “You don’t see
what the mood is here, and how this has a kind of mo-
mentum of its own. And we will be left behind, and we’ll
be less capable of shaping this”. The argument was that
the policywas extremely important to France and theUK,
it fit within the international liberal order and identity
narratives espoused by the US and its allies, and the US
would be left out if it did not agree to the intervention in
this case.
Obama, according to Lewis, wanted to make sure
that allies were ready to engage: “He wanted to say to
the Europeans and to other Arab countries: We’ll do
most of the actual bombing because only we can do it
quickly, but you have to clean up the mess afterward”.
And while there are number of other issues that Obama
suggested affected his decision, including weighing the
potential risk to military personnel, and the ability to
get the UN resolution passed, he also considered the
fact that “Sarkozy and Cameron were far enough out
there to follow through”. Finally, hemade the decision to
push for the UN resolution. Lewis (2012) notes: “Of the
choice not to intervene he [Obama] says, ‘That’s not who
we are’”.
Once a decision was made, Obama used a strate-
gic narrative to justify that decisions and the military
action that followed that emphasized the alliance in-
volved. Speaking at the National Defense University on
28 March, he emphasized US leadership within a coali-
tion, and stressed the responsibility to maintain inter-
national order (Obama, 2011): “To summarize, then: In
just one month, the US has worked with our interna-
tional partners to mobilize a broad coalition, secure an
international mandate to protect civilians, stop an ad-
vancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a no-
fly zone with our allies and partners”. Ultimately, despite
Obama’s hesitancy to become embroiled in an overseas
military operation, the US would not be left behind and
would not argue against the French and British narrative
that was consistent with US Identity Narratives.
This case study highlights how system and identity
narratives can be used within alliances to affect the be-
havior of an individual member of the alliance. By em-
phasizing common identity narratives, alliance members
may push the uncertain member of the alliance to fall on
one side of the issue. Specifically, the system and iden-
tity narratives set the stage for the implication that the
US would be left out of decision-making on Libya if it did
not go along with the French and UK desire for interven-
tion. Obama was able to shape the mission because of
the agreement on intervention and participation.
7. Ukraine: Crisis in 2014
The second case study focuses on how strategic narrative
contestation can affect alliances. In this case the Russian
government, under the leadership of President Vladimir
Putin, used strategic narratives to counter US explana-
tions about events on the ground in the Ukraine, to chal-
lenge US authority in the international system, and to
undermine US sanctions efforts. In so doing, Western al-
liance cohesion was threatened. For example, Hungary,
Slovakia and the Czech Republic opposed EU sanctions
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(Luhn, 2014).6 This case study focuses on events from
February 2014 when then President Yanukovych left of-
fice and sought refuge in Russia aftermassive demonstra-
tions in Ukraine until 31 October 2014. Russian strategic
narratives are derived from speeches of President Putin
and other Russian leaders. Specific attention is paid to
Russian narratives viamassmedia, and to a lesser degree,
US and European responses to those narratives. This case
examines how the Russian narrative about the annexa-
tion of Crimea was developed to promote domestic sup-
port and to challenge NATO alliance identity narratives
by attempting, in part, to arouse fears of entrapment.
Putin’s 18 March speech on the referendum in
Crimea set out the Russian strategic narrative about the
crisis in Ukraine (Prague Post Magazine, 2014).7 Putin
first said that 84% of the population had voted and 96%
wanted Crimean unification with Russia. And then he ex-
plained the outcome this way: “To understand the rea-
son behind such a choice it is enough to know the his-
tory of Crimea and what Russia and Crimea have al-
waysmeant for each other”. This history, Putin explained,
tied Ukraine, Belarus and Russia together and glorified
Russian valor and was inherently connected to Iden-
tity Narratives:
Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history
and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones,
where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat
of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall ba-
sis of the culture, civilization and human values that
unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. The
graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought
Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.
This is also Sevastopol—a legendary city with an out-
standing history, a fortress that serves as the birth-
place of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. Crimea is Balaklava
and Kerch, Malakhov Kurgan and Sapun Ridge. Each
one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing
Russian military glory and outstanding valor. (Prague
Post Magazine, 2014)
Note the importance of Orthodoxy as part of an Identity
Narrative. This is tied together with Russian identity.
Putin blamed former Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev
for disrupting the history by annexing Crimea to Ukraine,
and when the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, “mil-
lions of people went to bed in one country and awoke
in different ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities
in former Union republics, while the Russian nation be-
came one of the biggest, if not the biggest ethnic group
in theworld to be divided by borders” (Prague PostMaga-
zine, 2014). All would have been fine, according to Putin’s
narrative, but “time and time again attempts were made
to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of
their language and to subject them to forced assimila-
tion” (Prague Post Magazine, 2014). After the change in
government, Putin said that the people of Crimea turned
to Russia for support and help. This historical narrative
explained and justified Russian behavior in 2014 to a do-
mestic Russian population.
Putin also addressed a televised “Meeting in support
of Crimea’s accession to the Russian Federation, ‘We
Are Together’” on 18 March (Presidential Executive Of-
fice, 2014a). The graphic on the stage depicted a heart
in white, blue, and red—the colors of the Russian flag—
and said “Crimea inmy heart!” Putin’s strategic narrative
fit squarely into an attempt to bolster domestic support,
particularly in light of protests in Moscow in 2011–2013.
Dougherty (2014, pp. 2–3) writes that “for Moscow, the
conflict in Ukraine is accelerating profound changes al-
ready under way in the Russian media: the centraliza-
tion and mobilization of information resources in the
hands of the state, providing the Kremlin—and President
Vladimir Putin—the means to galvanize public opinion
domestically and in the region, as well as forcefully as-
sert Russia’s policies, views and—increasingly—values in-
ternationally”. Putin had solidified control over domestic
media in a number of ways (Birnbaum, 2014;Mickiewicz,
2014, p. 56).
Many Western countries directly challenged the Rus-
sian narrative, and identified it by name as a narra-
tive. British Ambassador Mark Lyall Grant called Russia’s
stance “A new fantasy narrative” while French Ambas-
sador Gerard Araud said it was “virtual reality” (Anna,
2014). The US, for its part, consistently challenged the
Russian narrative. TheUS StateDepartment, for example,
set up online blogs, one of which covered a United Na-
tions speech by US Ambassador Samantha Powers, who
said in June 2014:
Russia has attempted, erroneously, to characterize
the events unfolding in eastern Ukraine as a human-
itarian crisis. They falsely have cast themselves as the
defender of rights and vindicator of the vulnerable;
and the Russian army and its operatives as a human-
itarian aid agency. But this Russian “aid” operation
sends soldiers, not doctors; it mans armored person-
nel carriers, not relief tents; it provides surface-to-air
missiles, not meals-ready-to-eat. (US Department of
State, 2014)
There were also other groups using social media and
website online to counter Russian narratives. See for
example, StopFake.org, which sets out the “struggle
against fake information about events in Ukraine”
(www.stopfake.org/en) or the work done by NATO’s
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
Beyond a focus on Ukraine itself and on Russia’s
history with Crimea, Putin used the Ukrainian case to
present an International System Narrative, describing
6 Geographic proximity to Russia and reliance on Russian gas do not determine support or opposition to economic sanctions. Poland and the Baltic states
strongly support sanctions.
7 The referendum was not recognized by Ukraine or the West.
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how changes in the international system led to other sit-
uations comparable to Ukraine, and implying that the US
and Western Europe are hypocritical in their condemna-
tion of Russia. Included among these comparable cases
was Kosovo, which Putin directly compared to Crimea:
“For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we
have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Rus-
sians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not
allowed” (Prague Post Magazine, 2014). Putin continued
by setting out an International System narrative that em-
phasized US hegemony and hypocrisy:
After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we
no longer have stability. Key international institutions
are not getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many
cases, they are sadly degrading. Ourwestern partners,
led by the US, prefer not to be guided by international
law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the
gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and
exceptionalism, that they can decide the destinies of
the world, that only they can ever be right. They act
as they please: here and there, they use force against
sovereign states, building coalitions based on the prin-
ciple “If you are not with us, you are against us”.
To make this aggression look legitimate, they force
the necessary resolutions from international organi-
sations, and if for some reason this does not work,
they simply ignore the UN Security Council and the
UN overall. (Prague Post Magazine, 2014)
Putin complained that the US and NATO did what they
wanted, expanding NATO toward the east,8 bombing
Belgrade, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and deploying a mis-
sile defense system in Europe asserting power over Rus-
sia. Putin developed this International System Narrative
throughout 2014, decrying US hegemony in the system:
This period of unipolar domination has convincingly
demonstrated that having only one power centre
does not make global processes more manageable.
On the contrary, this kind of unstable construction
has shown its inability to fight the real threats such
as regional conflicts, terrorism, drug trafficking, reli-
gious fanaticism, chauvinism and neo-Nazism. At the
same time, it has opened the road wide for inflated
national pride, manipulating public opinion and let-
ting the strong bully and suppress the weak. Essen-
tially, the unipolar world is simply a means of justify-
ing dictatorship over people and countries. The unipo-
lar world turned out too uncomfortable, heavy and
unmanageable a burden even for the self-proclaimed
leader. (Presidential Executive Office, 2014b)
For those in world who have been critical of US unilat-
eral action in Iraq, for example, Putin’s narrative could
find resonance. It also spoke to many in Eastern Europe
that might feel as if membership in the European Union
and/or NATO required national interests to be subsumed
until the broader organization’s interests or demands. In
other words, perhaps states could become entrapped by
an alliancewhich asked them to sacrifice formembership
in a broader alliance. This then could bolster support for
Issue Narratives in a number of areas, including Ukraine.
Russia’s International System Narrative during this
time was projected within a broader Russian initiative to
develop international communication outlets to counter
Western, and particularly US, strategic narratives. Dim-
itri Kiselov, whom Putin appointed to head a newly or-
ganized media structure in Russia in 2013 said that his
job was “Restoring a fair attitude towards Russia as an
important country in the world with good intentions—it
is the mission of the new structure, which will lead me”
(Lenta, 2013). Putin himself said that soft power—which
is inherently linked to strategic narratives (Roselle et al.,
2014)—is a central concern for Russian foreign policy:
Soft power, a comprehensive toolkit for achieving
foreign policy objectives building on civil society po-
tential, information, cultural and other methods and
technologies alternative to traditional diplomacy, is
becoming an indispensable component of modern in-
ternational relations. At the same time, increasing
global competition and the growing crisis potential
sometimes creates a risk of destructive and unlaw-
ful use of “soft power” and human rights concepts
to exert political pressure on sovereign states, inter-
fere in their internal affairs, destabilize their politi-
cal situation, manipulate public opinion, including un-
der the pretext of financing cultural and human rights
projects abroad. (Putin, 2013)
Russia spent money on international broadcasting, in-
cluding development of RT (formerly Russia Today)
(Dougherty, 2014). The contestation of strategic narra-
tives was (and is) front and center for the Russian leader.
Turningmore directly to howRussian narrativeswere
used to try to undermine or weaken alliances, particu-
larly in Europe, there are component parts of the Russian
narrative that found resonance in Eastern Europe, and
with certain audiences in Western Europe and the US.
The idea that the US and NATO take advantage of those
who are weaker and calls for the support of Christian val-
ues can be found in some (but not all) of the speeches
of political elites in Eastern Europe, for example. In the
countries that have not supported sanctions—Slovakia,
Hungary, and increasingly during this period some in the
Czech Republic—one can see overlapping narratives. For
example, Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico asserted,
in explaining opposition to economic sanctions, that, “Eu-
rope hasn’t learned from the past ‘and we still continue
seeking enemies’” (The Slovak Spectator, 2014). This ties
into comments by him that compared increased NATO
8 NATO admitted the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland in 1999. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined.
Albania and Croatia joined in 2009.
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troop deployments in Central and Eastern Europe to the
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by theWarsawPact (The
Economist, 2014). Russia’s depiction of NATO’s expan-
sion of power fits into this narrative.9 Hungary’s presi-
dent, meanwhile, found resonant Putin’s narrative about
“Christian” values and domestic politics supported this
(Luhn, 2014). In Hungary the Russian narrative fit with
a “nationalist rhetoric aimed at foreign energy corpora-
tions and the EU” (Verseck, 2014). Finally in the Czech Re-
public, President Milos Zeman characterized the conflict
in Ukraine as a civil war rather than as Russian aggression
(EUbusiness.com, 2014). Thus Russian system narratives
that emphasized US overreach or entrapment found res-
onance in some circles, as did identity narratives about
“Christian” values. These narratives could be used to sup-
port domestic political ambitions of political actors, even
as they threatened European cohesion.
8. Analysis and Conclusions
The cases presented above examine the role of strate-
gic narratives within alliances. If we are to understand
the (re)construction of alliances over time, it is impor-
tant to understand how strategic narratives work within
alliances and as outside challenges to alliances. First,
strategic narratives can shape how alliance interests, val-
ues and identity are understood by members—as illus-
trated in the case of Libya. In this case, French and British
narratives shaped theway thematerial conditions on the
ground were presented, and suggested that the identity
of the member states within the alliance demanded mil-
itary action. This can, in part, explain why states agree
to go along with allies’ preferred policies under certain
circumstances, speaking to the literature on representa-
tional force (Bially Mattern, 2005). Bially Mattern argues
that shared identity can create order and structure ex-
pectations about behavior. Identity narratives may be
used by allies to influence policy decisions arguing that
the alliance “must” pursue a certain policy because “that
iswhoweare”. This adds insight intowhy stateswith simi-
lar regime types aremore likely to align—they share Iden-
tity Narratives (Lai & Reiter, 2000). In addition, there is
some evidence that these narratives were used to raise a
broader fear of abandonment. If the US did not go along
with France and the UK, especially after they had gone
along with the US in Afghanistan, the US would be out-
side of policymaking on Libya.
Second, the Ukrainian case illustrates how those out-
side of an alliance may attempt to use strategic narra-
tives to undermine alliance cohesion by raising fears of
entrapment. Here, both system and identity narratives
of NATO were challenged or contested by Russian nar-
ratives. Russia’s narrative that, in a post-bipolar world,
the West, led by the US, acted selfishly, hypocritically,
and without regard for international law challenged the
Western alliance narrative. It suggested that countries
within the alliance should fear a “dictator” US telling
them what to do. Parts of Russia’s strategic narrative
questioning Western behavior and promoting “Christian
values” were (and are) resonant among some, but not
all, political actors in the NATO alliance. It is important to
understand how these strategic narratives that threaten
alliance cohesion may serve domestic political purposes
within alliance member states. These Russian narratives
developed in part to serve Russian domestic political
needs as well—in this case to bolster support for the an-
nexation of Crimea and for Putin himself.10
These two cases show how important understand-
ing narrative (re)construction is to understanding inter-
national order and policy behavior. They also illustrate
how important domestic political considerations can be.
Clearly more work needs to be done on the conditions
under which strategic narratives affect alliance cohesion
and decisionmaking. Under what conditions do strategic
narratives shape alliance policy decisions and the inter-
national order more broadly? Under what conditions are
outside narrative challenges to alliances successful? How
does this work in a new communication environment?
What role does fear of entrapment and fear of abandon-
ment play in alliance relations, and how are narratives
linked to these fears. The cases do suggest that under-
standing strategic narrative communication should be an
important component of the study of alliances and inter-
national order.
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